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For the past three centuries, the economic geography of the global coffee sector has been charac-
terized by the supply of beans from tropical countries for consumption in North America and
Europe, with various modes of value chain coordination enacted by lead firms to ensure reliable
and affordable supply. This pattern is now fundamentally changing, with growth in coffee con-
sumption in emerging markets, including China, exceeding that in established markets. But China
is not only a growing consumer market, it is less well known that rapidly increasing agricultural
production in Yunnan province of southwest China has also inserted the country as an important
source region for coffee, and this has been pivotal in facilitating the emergence of Chinese lead
firms in the sector. This article presents the emergence of China, and Chinese firms, at a critical
juncture for the structure and governance of the global value chain for coffee. The processes
through which this is occurring are outlined, and the implications for regional development pros-
pects across Southeast Asia are discussed. We argue that the changing economic geography of coffee
value chains, and their increasing driven-ness by Chinese actors, is starting to reshape the regional
coffee industry in profoundly new ways.
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Introduction
The introduction of coffee cultivation by European colonialists to Asia at the close of
the 17th century, and then to the Americas in the 18th century, marked an initial glob-
alizing moment for the commodity coffee. For the subsequent three centuries, coffee
beans were produced and exported from various tropical countries, often under highly
coercive and exploitative colonial regimes, to consumer markets in Europe, North
America, and, during the last 50 years, Japan. Despite the effective demise of European
colonialism during the twentieth century, the continued inequalities along the global
coffee chain have been well-documented (Talbot, 2004; Daviron & Ponte, 2005), as
has the pivotal position of coffee roasters in driving and coordinating the entire chain
back to farm production (Ponte, 2002). The resulting governance structures along the
value chain have been founded on dominant consumption in the North, and the driv-
ing role of lead firms based in those countries.
In this article, we adopt and apply a global value chain (GVC) framework to exam-
ine the multi-dimensional role of China, and Chinese firms, in the changing economic
geography of coffee. The prominence of global production and distribution systems,
which bring together diverse economic actors through a complex regime of global cor-
porate governance, widespread outsourcing of productive functions, and new interna-
tional divisions of labour, has stimulated the rise of corresponding conceptual models
to explain these developments (Neilson et al., 2014).
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The dual processes of continued high rates of consumption in the Global North
and expanding economic opportunities for value chain participation elsewhere in the
world have characterized global economic restructuring in recent decades. While
the growth of broad productive capabilities in East Asia has been well-documented,
the 2008–09 global financial crisis was widely seen as a turning point in the global
economy, where demand for various finished and intermediate goods shifted from
North to South (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Fung, 2011). Indeed, Fung (2011) believes that
the organization of the global economy is entering a new phase, where we have
reached a ‘major inflection point’, with important implications for the structure of
global value chains. These developments are generally analysed in terms of ‘shifting
end markets’, with Kaplinsky and Farooki (2011) identifying the impacts of Chinese
demand in particular on other developing country exporters. These consequences
include: i) a reversal of the trend toward product differentiation as standard com-
modities are supplied; ii) a reduced importance of social, environmental and quality
standards (refer also to the discussion in Bowles & MacPhail, 2014); and iii) greater
competition with other developing countries for capturing the value-added of pro-
cessing of raw materials. Kaplinsky and Farooki (2011) admitted, however, that this
hypothesis required further testing.
A further apparent implication of shifting end markets for GVCs is the increased
regionalization of value chains (identified by Kaplinsky & Farooki, 2011, Morris et al.,
2011, and Lee & Gereffi, 2015). In the African clothing complex, for example, the rise
of South African clothing manufacturers, driven by South African retailers, resulted in
new opportunities for suppliers in Lesotho and Swaziland relative to US buyer-driven
chains (Morris et al., 2011). Lee and Gereffi (2015) identified the regionalization of
value chains as being further driven by the distinct growth strategies of emerging
nation lead firms, which include pursuing low-cost innovation strategies and targeting
the low and middle income segments in emerging economies rather than competing
with large multinationals active at higher price markets. Similarly, Li and Ding (2015)
examined China’s apparent new role as a market provider for consumer goods from
the region, which they suggested would involve increased efforts to develop regional
economic cooperation arrangements (discussed also by Cai, 2017, in the context of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative).
The emergence of China, and Chinese firms, as key actors within the global
coffee sector has not been hitherto discussed in the literature. While China’s
surging coffee consumption receives some attention, there has been very limited,
if any, research on the status and the implications of China’s concurrent emer-
gence as a coffee producer. In this article we discuss the relatively recent entry of
China as a producer (emerging only in the late 2000s), and the subsequent emer-
gence of influential Chinese firms in the sector. As such, this paper attempts to
chart emerging industry dynamics in this sector, and to contextualize them
within the broader economic geography of the global and regional coffee indus-
tries. We argue that the repositioning of Chinese coffee firms reflects a more
widespread shift in the organization of the global economy. China is reshaping its
role in the GVC of coffee in two ways. On the one hand, large Chinese trading
firms are emerging as potential global lead firms by virtue of trading significant
volumes of raw coffee globally, but they are also developing their own brands
and assuming the functions of roaster lead firms at various scales. Meanwhile,
surging domestic production in Yunnan province of southwest China has pro-
vided a platform for the emergence of integrated Chinese coffee companies who
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are following an alternative path towards lead firm status. Although these latter
firms are not yet global in scope, their operations are expanding into neighbour-
ing regions and extending their regional influence. In both ways, state supports
are instrumental for fostering these transitional and domestic enterprises into
lead firms.
It is not entirely clear in the literature as to what exactly constitutes a ‘lead firm’.
The term emerged from Gereffi’s (1994) articulation of global commodity chains as
being either producer-driven or buyer-driven, which seemed to suggest that a partic-
ular ‘core company’ would be responsible for ‘governing’ the entire commodity chain
globally. Gereffi (1999: 38) then emphasizes the role of ‘lead firms [as] the primary
sources of material inputs, technology transfer, and knowledge in these organizational
networks’. The closely-aligned literature on Global Production Networks (GPNs) is
particularly forthright about requiring a (single) global lead firm as an integral aspect
of defining a GPN. According to Coe and Yeung (2015: 39−40, emphasis in original),
‘a global production network necessarily entails the central role of one globally signif-
icant lead firm’, and that ‘the necessary presence of a global lead firm differentiates a
global production network from a (global) commodity chain because the latter may
not be organised around a single lead firm’. In this paper, we do not follow this more
restricted GPN definition of a globally significant lead firm, and instead use the term
in the broader sense of a firm capable of exerting a meaningful degree of governance
elsewhere in the chain irrespective of scale and geographic scope. This follows the
earlier work of Fold (2002), who emphasized how more complicated patterns of
power relations can exist between (multiple) lead firms in a single global chain, and
Lee and Gereffi (2015), who highlight the emergence of bipolar or multi-polar GVC
governance, while also making an implicit distinction between ‘lead firms’ and ‘global
lead firms’. We can certainly identify a set of large global lead firms (multinational
coffee manufacturers) in the GVC for coffee, each of whom could be understood to
govern their own GPN. However, large international trading firms could also be con-
sidered lead firms in their own right, as they coordinate the actions of actors else-
where in the chain, and indeed they are capable of exerting a global influence. In the
work of Coe and Yeung (2015), however, these firms might be considered ‘special-
ized suppliers’ to lead firms, or indeed as ‘relational suppliers’ by Gereffi et al. (2005).
Furthermore, smaller coffee roasters located in various consumer markets perform
functionally indistinct roles to larger lead firms (value-added manufacturing, supply
chain control and coordination, marketing and branding)—albeit at a smaller scale
and sometimes confined within a single country. Therefore, we suggest it is not
always a straightforward task to identify the ‘lead firm’ in a GVC, or even to clearly
set criteria for what constitutes a ‘lead firm’.
The research findings presented in this article draw upon a mixed method
approach. We conducted a series of 70 interviews with coffee industry stakeholders in
Yunnan province and 4 interviews in Chongqing during November 2016, November
and December 2017, interviewing farmers, commercial estate managers, migrant
labourers, government representatives, and industry actors (small-scale roasters,
traders and large corporate firms) and operators of commodity exchanges. The inter-
viewees also included representatives of coffee industries from other Asian countries in
Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia. These interviews were complemented with a
detailed analysis of trade data using the UN Comtrade database and a review of media
articles on the industry using Factiva searches in both the Chinese and English
languages.
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The global value chain for coffee
Various applications of a GVC or global commodity chain (GCC) approach to the coffee
industry over the last few decades (inter alia Talbot, 1997; Talbot, 2002; Ponte, 2002;
Talbot, 2004; Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Neilson, 2008; Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Grabs,
2018) have consistently identified a range of characteristic chain dynamics. The funda-
mental geography of coffee production and trade has, until very recently, remained
largely consistent with earlier colonial patterns. Coffee has been grown almost entirely
within the less developed regions of the tropical Global South, with five countries
(Brazil, Vietnam, Colombia, Indonesia, and Ethiopia) estimated to be responsible for
69 per cent of global production in 2016, while the European Union and the USA were
responsible for 67 per cent of all imports (FAO, 2017). Talbot’s (1997) analysis of the
division of total income and surplus along the coffee chain identified a fundamental
chain characteristic: producing countries capture very little of the total value-added
along the chain, and that their ability to do so has worsened over time. The Hopkins
and Wallerstein (1986) approach to commodity chains, inspired by World Systems
Analysis, interprets such uneven distribution of benefits as reflecting neo-colonial
structural inequalities between core countries (and chain nodes) and periphery coun-
tries (and nodes), although we argue that the rise of Chinese firms (and firms in vari-
ous other producing countries) is challenging the permanence of these designations.
The collapse, in 1989, of a quota system of state-regulated trade under the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreements was a key moment in the evolution of the contemporary
GVC for coffee, marking the broader end to the neo-structuralist, UNCTAD-mediated
world trade order and the ascendance of neo-liberalism. This deregulation event facili-
tated the rise and consolidation of the power of transnational coffee companies—
primarily coffee manufacturers, also known as roasters—as capable of effectively gov-
erning the chain (Ponte, 2002). Grabs (2018) estimated that eight such manufacturers
(Nestlé, Jacobs Douwe Egberts, Green Mountain, JM Smuckers, Strauss, Starbucks,
Tchibo, Lavazza) held a 53 per cent share of the global coffee retail market in 2014.
From their headquarters in the Global North, these manufacturers are quintessential
lead firms, ultimately responsible for governing supply chains back to rural producers
in the Global South.
Despite a reasonable degree of concentration and recent acquisitions (Grabs, 2018),
many smaller specialty roasters persist (in both established and in new emerging mar-
kets), and these could also be functionally considered lead firms in their own right due
to their role in chain governance. Manufacturers, moreover, tend to rely on large com-
modity traders to supply them with green beans. Neilson (2008) observed how these
commodity traders (dominated by firms such as Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, Ecom
Agroindustrial, Louis Dreyfus, and ED&F Man /Volcafe), are increasingly active in
sourcing green coffee in producing regions, and in implementing farm-level supply
chain sustainability and quality improvement programs on behalf of manufacturers. As
will be discussed below, these traditional commodity traders are now competing with a
newer global entrant—China’s COFCO.
In 2018, the institutional settings of the global value chain for coffee are character-
ized by limited state intervention, but with an expanding system of private regulation
by both corporate firms and NGOs. This is most notable through the expansion of vari-
ous sustainability programs orchestrated along the value chain between consumers and
producers (Jaffee, 2014; Panhuysen & Pierrot, 2014; Levy et al., 2016; Grabs, 2018).
Low world coffee prices (especially during the period 2000 to 2004) led to widespread
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reports of extreme poverty in coffee-growing communities and what was identified as
a ‘global coffee crisis’ (Osorio, 2002; Vega et al., 2003; Bacon, 2005; Daviron & Ponte,
2005). The fact that this occurred at the same time as consumption was experiencing
something of a renaissance in the Global North, through the growth of the specialty
coffee sector, shined a spotlight on inequalities along the chain. Daviron and Ponte
(2005) referred to this contemporaneous boom in specialty coffee alongside a crisis in
producing countries as ‘The Coffee Paradox’, which they explain in terms of chain gov-
ernance structures that allow roasters and retailers to extract value from symbolic and
in-person attributes of quality. While global prices have recovered somewhat since
2004, it is still reasonable to assert that today’s GVC remains characterized by consider-
able inequality between relatively impoverished growers and relatively profitable
roasters who are geographically proximate to affluent consumers. Initiatives to address
this inequality are being primarily pursued through private sector governance and the
various sustainability labels.
China’s entry into the world coffee industry
Twenty years ago, China was essentially excluded from the GVC for coffee. Coffee pro-
duction in China, Yunnan province more specifically, has increased five-fold since
2001 (Figure 1), making China the 13th largest coffee producer in the world by 2016,
rising from 30th in 2006 (Table 1). Yunnan comprises 98 per cent of China’s coffee
output (Chen, 2013). Annual production levels are difficult to determine with any cer-
tainty, but these have been estimated between approximately 120 000 tonnes in 2014
by the International Coffee Organization (ICO, 2015), and up to 158 400 tonnes in
2016/2017 (by Huang et al., 2017). Yunnan grows Arabica coffee—mainly of the Cati-



















































Figure 1. Estimated coffee production and consumption in China (1995−2014).
Source: Figure prepared by authors based on data obtained from FAO, 2017; ICO, 2015.
Consumption estimates are based on preceding ICO crop years (ie. 1995 for 1994/95
crop year).
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and Baoshan (Figure 2). Yunnan has a suitable biophysical environment for coffee pro-
duction: a supportive climate, high altitudes, and the absence of the coffee borer beetle
(as of 2017). It has also developed some of the most productive coffee systems in the
world (reported by some producers to be as high as three tonnes of green bean equiva-
lent per hectare) based on high input of fertilizers and other high-yielding technologies.
Due to the relatively recent history of coffee production in Yunnan, coffee has received
much less attention from researchers compared with other cash crops in Yunnan, such
as rubber.
Coffee cultivation has, at various times throughout the last century, been promoted
as a prospective cash crop in Yunnan. The earliest coffee trees are thought to have been
initially introduced to Yunnan from neighbouring colonial regimes in Vietnam in 1892,
by a French priest to a Yi village close to Dali city, and in British Burma by ethnic
Jingpo (known as Kachin in Burma) to Dehong (Hu, 2014). Coffee cultivation was also
suggested as a suitable means of rural development during the era of Republic (Chang,
1942), and during the 1950s and 1960s, when coffee was encouraged for trade with
the former Soviet Union. Despite these earlier beginnings, the total area of land planted
with coffee was never very significant, achieving a peak of only 4000 mu (one hectare
is equal to approximately 15 mu) in the 1960s (Hu, 2014).
Contrary to the usual speculation, the increase in production appears to be only
indirectly linked to domestic consumption. Instead, the increase was driven by invest-
ments made initially by export-oriented international firms, with Nestle being a major
player. In 1988, Nestle established an instant coffee factory in Guangdong Province,











1 Brazil 2,573,368 31.6% Brazil 3,019,051 32.7%
2 Viet Nam 985,300 12.1% Viet Nam 1,460,800 15.8%
3 Colombia 724,740 8.9% Colombia 745,084 8.1%
4 Indonesia 682,158 8.4% Indonesia 639,305 6.9%
5 Mexico 279,635 3.4% Ethiopia 469,091 5.1%
6 India 274,000 3.4% Honduras 362,367 3.9%
7 Peru 273,178 3.4% India 348,000 3.8%
8 Ethiopia 241,482 3.0% Peru 277,760 3.0%
9 Guatemala 240,331 2.9% Guatemala 236,145 2.6%
10 Honduras 213,636 2.6% Uganda 203,535 2.2%
11 Ivory Coast 187,000 2.3% Mexico 151,714 1.6%
12 Burundi 149,460 1.8% Laos 136,600 1.5%
13 Uganda 133,310 1.6% China 114,339 1.2%
14 Philippines 104,093 1.3% Nicaragua 114,307 1.2%
15 Costa Rica 101,038 1.2% Ivory Coast 102,960 1.1%
16 El Salvador 85,350 1.0% Costa Rica 87,490 0.9%
17 Venezuela 74,332 0.9% Philippines 68,823 0.7%
18 Nicaragua 70,455 0.9% Papua New
Guinea
58,894 0.6%
19 Cameroon 62,300 0.8% Tanzania 52,257 0.6%
20 Madagascar 61,635 0.8% Madagascar 46,882 0.5%
30 China 25,655 0.3%
Source: Table prepared by authors based on data obtained from http://www.fao.org/faostat/.
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which was reliant on imported raw coffee beans, prompting the government to
encourage Nestle to develop a local supply base. In response, and also driven by corpo-
rate desires to diversify its supply source, Nestle established an office in Kunming, capi-
tal of Yunnan, in 1991. By 1997, Nestle had established agricultural assistance services
across Yunnan and provided training for more than 16 000 farmers (company repre-
sentative, pers. comm., Puer city, November, 2016), and has since been the largest sin-
gle buyer, performing a pivotal role in stimulating regional production. Yunnan
Figure 2. Map of Yunnan coffee areas.
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produces Arabica coffee, whilst instant coffee manufacturing generally relies on
imported Robusta. Another global lead firm, Starbucks, followed Nestle by establishing
its own sourcing operation in Yunnan in 2009, through a joint-venture with a local
agri-business company, apparently in response to similar encouragement from the Chi-
nese government as the firm expanded its retail presence along China’s urbanized eastern
seaboard. By 2017, many of the major international trading companies, including Ecom
Agroindustrial, Neumann (indirectly), Louis Dreyfuss, and Olam, were actively sourcing
coffee from Yunnan for export.
The sourcing strategies of these international firms are relatively similar, although
the two manufacturing firms tend to engage more intensely in farmer development ini-
tiatives. In 2016, Nestle opened a new Nestle Coffee Centre in Puer, comprising a train-
ing centre, a laboratory, a quality control lab and a modern warehouse. Strategically, it
is part of a plan to reinforce supply to two manufacturing facilities located in China,
while also supplying facilities elsewhere in the world. In 2016−2017, Nestle operated
several collection stations across Yunnan, while Starbucks also established a smaller-
scale farmer support centre in 2012. Both companies ultimately depend upon supply
from small farmers, farmer cooperatives and small to medium domestic enterprises.
These international firms tend to enforce relatively strict production and supply stan-
dards that require traceability, such as the 4C Coffee code, Starbucks CAFÉ Practices
standard and the Nespresso program.
Strong international demand, and the involvement of these global lead firms in
encouraging production, has meant that coffee cultivation has exceeded government
plans. The Yunnan government planned, in 2010, to expand the plantation area to
1 million mu by 2020 (DRCYP/DAY, 2010), a target that was actually surpassed in
2013 (Puer City Government, 2016). Rapid expansion can be attributed to relatively
high market prices from around 2009, coinciding with an outbreak of leaf rust in
Colombia that affected global Arabica supply. Although subdued prices have since
resulted in some farmers replacing coffee with other cash crops, the expansion of new
coffee plantations has exceeded this replacement.
Institutional support for Yunnan’s coffee industry is fragmented, and tends to be
dominated by the relationship between the state and selected firms. Prefectural level
governments have been relatively active in supporting the industry, especially the Puer
Government, which welcomed Nestle’s initial investment during the 1980s. Puer also
established the first official unit (The Office of Coffee Industry) in 2012, and the
‘Bureau of Tea Industry’ was re-structured into the ‘Bureau of Tea and Coffee’ in
2015. The Puer government also included the coffee industry in its 5-year master plan
during both 12th (2011−2015) and 13th (2016−2020) periods, while allocating
200 million RMB (31 million USD) of funding from various sectors (financial, agricul-
tural, forestry, poverty alleviation and resettlement activities) for developing coffee
farms (Zheng, 2015). In contrast, Dehong and Lincang prefecture governments have
both supported single large firms to have near-monopoly status as drivers of coffee
development in their prefectures (Hogood in Dehong and Linfeng in Lincang,
respectively).
While reliable data on domestic coffee consumption in China is difficult to obtain,
the ICO (2015) has inferred consumption from available data on production, exports
and imports, which indicate that consumption has increased nearly ten-fold between
2007 and 2014 (Figure 1), but at a low annual per capita level of 0.08 kg (ICO, 2015).
As is common in many emergent coffee-drinking cultures, Chinese consumers cur-
rently prefer instant coffee (commonly produced from Robusta beans), which
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constitute 99 per cent of retail sales by volume (ICO, 2015). The Chinese consumer
market, still with significant growth potential, is currently supplied by imported raw
materials and processed products, while Arabica production is primarily exported as
green beans.
Positioning China within the global value chain for coffee: a trade-based
analysis
We can generate insights into China’s position within the GVC for coffee by more
closely examining international trade data. Based on the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS codes), the international trade in coffee can, for
our purposes, be disaggregated into: i) unprocessed green coffee beans (HS901110); ii)
roasted coffee (HS901210); and iii) coffee extracts (soluble or instant coffees,
HS210112). Figure 3 shows the growth of China’s international trade in these three
coffee categories since 1998, and how trade is dominated by movements of green
beans. This is not unusual globally, as green beans are generally processed into roasted
or soluble coffee near sites of consumption, and China’s international trade in pro-
cessed coffee products is actually quite high comparatively. During the 1990s, China
developed a coffee manufacturing base, with exports primarily directed towards Hong
Kong, which has absorbed around 70 per cent of China’s soluble coffee exports since
1998. In terms of value, moreover, soluble coffee exports are more valuable than green
bean exports (Table 2).
The reason for China’s active involvement in both the import and export of coffee
products becomes evident in Figure 4, which shows how China’s trade is oriented
towards very different market segments in terms of quality and price, and Table 3,
which shows the three major trading partners for each category. China imports higher
priced roasted coffees, mainly from the USA and Italy. International coffee brands are
well received in China, dominated by Nestlé with a 66 per cent retail value share in
2016, with the market slowly moving towards premium brands (Euromonitor, 2017).

















Imports green coffee Exports green coffee
Imports roasted coffee Exports roasted coffee
Imports soluble coffee Exports soluble coffee
Figure 3. China’s trade in coffee products (volume) from 1998−2015.
Source: Figure prepared by authors based on data obtained from UN Comtrade, 2017.
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Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. In terms of green beans, however, the price level of
China’s exports has been consistently higher than its imports. Figure 5, furthermore,
shows how the price of China’s green bean imports follow very closely the prevailing
international price for Robusta coffee, and it is this variety that it imports primarily
from Vietnam and Indonesia. China’s green bean exports are certainly higher priced
than its Robusta imports (Figure 4), but Figure 5 shows how Chinese green bean
exports are generally traded at a discount to the ‘Other Milds’1 category in the world
market. China is an increasingly important source of Arabica coffee for major buyers in
North America and Europe, where it appears to enjoy a niche as a somewhat low-cost
source of commercial grade Arabica coffee. China, then, has engaged with the global
value chain for coffee in a complex myriad of ways.
Nestle’s early investment in soluble coffee manufacturing in China provided oppor-
tunities for value adding to imported green beans, sourced primarily from regional
partners in Southeast Asia. This business model was later adopted by other Chinese
companies, including a Yunnan coffee producer, Hogood, which has become one of
the three largest soluble coffee manufacturers in China, and is also intimately involved
in Yunnan production sites. Strong Chinese demand for instant coffees has also pro-
vided further opportunities for upgrading within Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and
Vietnam, who have all increased their sales of soluble coffee to China over the last five
years. Meanwhile, China’s coffee trading relationship with countries in North America
and Western Europe has, so far, remained a classical north-south one based on green
bean exports and imported roasted products.
Table 2. China’s 2015 coffee imports and exports.
Commodity Imports Exports
Volume (kg) Value (US$) Volume (kg) Value (US$)
Green coffee 49,276,673 119,096,129 61,637,906 179,786,686
Roasted coffee 9,099,861 102,196,668 4,778,155 47,361,317
Soluble coffee 26,488,958 203,125,733 24,527,300 208,244,957



















Imported green coffee Exported green coffee
Imported roasted coffee Exported roasted coffee
Imported soluble coffee Exported soluble coffee
Figure 4. Average prices of China’s trade in coffee products.
Source: Figure prepared by authors based on data obtained from UN Comtrade, 2017.
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Sourcing strategies by downstream coffee firms
China’s emerging position as an important coffee producer, consumer, exporter and
importer is beginning to reshape global, and particularly regional, coffee value chains.
As coffee production within China develops, Chinese firms are assuming an increas-
ingly strategic role within Yunnan and in neighboring countries, and have begun
challenging the prior dominance of international commodity traders and roaster lead
firms elsewhere. At the same time, the Chinese state, at various levels, is actively
enabling Chinese firms to play increasingly strategic roles within coffee value chains
and as a vehicle for achieving broader policy objectives related to both agricultural
modernization within China and geopolitically through regional economic
integration.
Agriculture within China has been significantly restructured over the past three
decades, accelerating rapidly since a series of policy changes under the name of ‘agri-
cultural modernization’ in the early 2000s, which encouraged land consolidation and
the vertical integration of agricultural supply chains. There are many aspects associated
with these changes, including: an increase of large farms and agribusinesses (Gong &
Zhang, 2017; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008; Schneider, 2017); increasingly heterogeneous
land-tenure practices (Krusekopf, 2002); complex and evolving production relations
(Guo et al., 2007, Zhang & Donaldson, 2008); and the increasing production of cash
crops for both domestic and export markets (Lohmar et al., 2009).
Table 3. China’s major coffee trading partners (based on 2011−2015 average values).
Imports Exports
Green Coffee Roasted Coffee Soluble coffee Green Coffee Roasted Coffee Soluble coffee
Vietnam USA Malaysia Germany Philippines Hong Kong
Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia USA Hong Kong Rep. Korea
Brazil Italy Rep. Korea Belgium Vietnam Vietnam




















ICO other milds indicator
ICO robusta Indicator
Figure 5. Average prices of China’s trade in green coffee relative to ICO indicator prices.
Source: Figure prepared by authors based on data obtained from UN Comrade, 2017; ICO, 2017.
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‘Nurturing large transnational agricultural enterprises’ was one of the main tasks
under China’s National Agricultural Modernization Plan (2016−2020). This is in line
with its ambitious plans to reshape global patterns of agricultural trade and to increase
its influence in global markets (Gooch & Gale, 2018). Perhaps the most significant
global player in this area is COFCO, one of the largest state-owned enterprise (SOE) in
China. Following its full acquisition of Hong Kong based commodity trader Noble Agri
in 2015 and Dutch trader Nidera in 2016 (COFCO Agri, 2016), Reuters (2018b) suggest
that COFCO’s broader strategic aim is to challenge the global dominance of the so-
called ABCD quartet of world-leading commodity traders (Archer Daniels Midland,
Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) and to perform a strategic role in sourcing food com-
modities for China. COFCO now has extensive logistical capabilities connected with
coffee value chains reaching into all major producing countries, including Vietnam,
Indonesia, India, Brazil and Colombia (COFCO Agri America, 2016). Annually, COFCO
trades a globally significant volume of coffee, with plans to trade five million bags of
coffee in 2018 (around 300 thousand tonnes), up from four million bags in 2017
(Bloomberg, 2018), an amount roughly equivalent to four per cent of global production.
COFCO also claims to supply raw coffee to 95 per cent of all roasters in China, but the
quantity is unclear (COFCO Coffee Weibo, 2018). COFCO, however, does not limit
itself to the Chinese market, and export data collected from Indonesia suggest that
COFCO’s key market destinations from Indonesia (at least in 2017) were in the USA,
Thailand and the Middle East, and included global lead firm manufacturers.
While COFCO is already a globally-influential trading firm, and could be considered
as a lead firm due to this global reach and influence along various supply chains, it also
holds further ambitions to establish itself as a leading manufacturer. Such a strategy is
consistent with the company’s prior involvement in food processing and branding with
products that include wines and spirits, tea, Coca-Cola bottling, and ice cream
(COFCO, 2018a). It has established its own coffee brand ‘Kofno’, opened a number of
coffee shops under the same name in cities like Beijing and Shanghai, and sells its
product online. While the market share of Kofno is difficult to determine, the brand is
nevertheless promoted by the Chinese government, and was designated as the ‘official
coffee brand’ for the 2014 APEC Summit and 2015 World Championships in Athletics,
both held in Beijing (CCPIT, 2014). Participation in a GVC as a ‘strategic supplier’ to
global lead firms has been demonstrated in other contexts to present a viable upgrading
pathway to higher value operations (Gereffi, 1999). Neilson et al. (2018) further
describe how the Singaporean firm, Delfi, has even abandoned its supplier role
(of intermediate chocolate products to global lead firms) to focus on becoming a global
lead firm (as a chocolate manufacturer) in its own right.
In addition to supporting large state-owned enterprises such as COFCO, the Chinese
government also attempts to scale-up and deepen processes of industrialization of its
domestic agriculture enterprises. Since 2008, the government has been promoting
New-type Agricultural Operators (NAOs), including dragon-head enterprises (DHE),
farmer cooperatives, specialized large farms and family farms, to develop and modern-
ize the rural economy. This policy is especially pertinent to the development of China’s
domestic lead firms. Modernization is associated with larger economies of scale, and
this generally requires merging and transferring rural land use rights from individual
or collectively owned farmlands to larger entities. When use rights are transferred, the
land remains collectively-owned and the contract rights remain with the farmers. This
is a departure from the earlier household responsibility system (HRS) policy in the
1980s, under which land transfer remained illegal, ownership remained with
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collectives, and use rights were allocated to households (Ye, 2015). Since 2008, state
policies have institutionalized and significantly accelerated the practice. While small
farmers have been the most significant producers of coffee in Yunnan, large integrated
companies are rapidly catching up and starting to compete directly with the dominant
international firms. Not coincidently, these recent policy shifts correspond to the rise of
two large domestic coffee companies in Yunnan, Hogood and Linfeng, both of whom
have obtained access to large swathes of agricultural land.
Smallholder production dominates in the two prefectures (Baoshan and Puer)
where coffee production was first established in Yunnan, with supply chains still pre-
dominately linked to global lead firms. In contrast, Hogood and Linfeng dominate pro-
duction landscapes in Dehong and Lincang prefectures respectively. These firms are
seen to be handmaidens for modernization. The domestic firms tend to operate under
the model of ‘firm + production base + farmer’, a model heavily promoted by all levels
of government in China as part of an agricultural industrialization agenda. This model
refers to the cooperation between company and rural households for agricultural pro-
duction combined with processing, sales and exporting. The ‘firm’ can be a private
business, a danwei (state-associated work units) or a farmer cooperative, which often
provides finance, technology and inputs, while recruiting farmers into production. The
term ‘production base’ is somewhat unclear, but generally refers to the land that may
be leased or transferred to the firm, in which case it is called a self-owned base. In
other cases, there is no contractual arrangement for the land, and the ‘base’ symbolizes
cooperation between farmers and firm. As this model is encouraged by government, a
lot of small and medium companies are adopting it. Because the concept of ‘base’ is
often symbolic, many companies tend to exaggerate the extent of their bases (often for
the purpose of accessing government subsidies), and a lot of bases appear to be over-
lapping with each other.
In providing a framework for these approaches, Table 4 presents a practical typol-
ogy, modified from Zhang and Donaldson (2008), to summarize the observed coffee
production relations in Yunnan, presented with decreasing agency for labour. Nestle
reported that nearly 90 per cent of their registered suppliers were small farmers culti-
vating less than 5 hectares (75 mu), but small firms (and cooperatives) comprise 73 per
cent of their supply by volume. Individual landholding sizes range from a dozen to sev-
eral dozen mu of land, which is larger than average landholdings across rural China
(less than 10 mu, according to Huang et al., 2012). For Type A farmers, Nestle and
other international firms have been the most important buyers, and tend to be more
active in implementing supply chain sustainability programs, and are able to exert
some level of control over otherwise independent farmers through market mecha-
nisms. While formal contracts (Type B) are rare, a domestic coffee chain store based in
Shanghai (Seesaw) was piloting its ‘commitment purchase’ for a second year in 2018,
with a dozen co-operatives and small companies following the processing methods
requested by this company. The widespread reallocation model (Type C) allows a more
direct degree of control by firms over production since they can reallocate production
rights from the leased land to more productive or malleable ‘contracting households’,
or chengbaohu. Smaller firms (mostly in Puer and Baoshan) may lease dozens of hect-
ares of plantation from fellow villagers or village groups, while large companies
(e.g. Hogood or Linfeng) often have formalized land rights transferred to the compa-
nies, which eventually control more than 6000 hectares. As land use rights belong to
the firms, the harvest must be sold to them, while the chengbaohu receives production-
based profits. Conventional plantations with labour entirely removed from the means
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of production (Type D) have also been established, but are less widespread. Some firms
have also leased land across international borders into Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos,
although the extent of Chinese involvement and the modes of production in these
areas is poorly documented.
International coffee firms, then, are largely restricted to relationships with indepen-
dent farmers (Type A), or through small firms that contract land through Type C
arrangements, while larger domestic firms prioritize having their own controlled pro-
duction base, where land use rights belong to the business (Type C and D). State sup-
port for this mode of operation is a crucial factor reshaping supply chain relations
within Yunnan, as exemplified through the operations of Hogood, a national-level
dragon-head enterprise.
Dragon-Head Enterprises (DHEs) in the coffee sector
The role of DHEs is crucial to understanding the rising influence of domestic Chinese
coffee firms. The discursive framing of DHEs was established by former Premier Wen
Jiabao, who stated that ‘supporting DHE is supporting agriculture and supporting
farmers’ (Xinhua News, 2000). These are agribusinesses with strong capacity for proces-
sing and marketing, and who the state considers likely to contribute to regional eco-
nomic development. The status of a DHE is officially bestowed by different levels of
government, ranging from national to county levels. In the coffee sector, Hogood is a
Table 4. Typology of labour and its relationship with coffee companies in China.
Type Labour type Operation Note Example of coffee
company
A Independent farmers Have no obligation to sell
to particular buyers.






B Contract farmers Farmers enter contracting
relationship with
agribusiness.
In Yunnan, the contract
is rarely maintained if it
is not established based




















D Labourers working on
a plantation






This labour may be local,






The company leases land
across international
borders and hire local
workers.
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national-level DHE and Linfeng is a provincial level DHE. Both companies receive sig-
nificant policy and financial support which enables land transfers, a crucial factor to
build extensive production bases, alongside access to capital from state-owned financial
institutions. These advantages are enabling the DHEs to become potential lead firms as
further opportunities emerge in the growing Chinese coffee market.
DHEs receive direct support in the forms of finance and tax benefits, with state-
owned banks required to cap interest rates for DHEs (Ministry of Agriculture, 2000)
and even provide zero interest loans. Moreover, financial support from central and
local governments is allocated to DHEs to establish their production base (including for
land leases). The criteria for a national-level DHE includes the scale of operation, the
ability to work across the entire value chain, and their competitive market advantage,
but criteria can vary geographically. In a western province like Yunnan, it must own
assets over 20 million RMB, generate over 50 million RMB revenue per year, and have
a debt ratio of less than 60 per cent (Ministry of Agriculture, 2001). The company
should also own its own production base, and be equipped with a complete supply
chain including production, processing and marketing, with a stable and strong market
share. DHEs have been promoted as key agents for vertical integration in order to
achieve the agricultural modernization agenda promoted by the state (Zhang &
Donaldson, 2008), while also facilitating competitive roles in higher value nodes of the
value chain.
Hogood was founded in 1994 and supplied coffee to Nestle prior to 2007, suggesting
a familiar upgrading pathway for Chinese manufacturing firms, whereby access to mar-
kets and knowledge was attained through an initial relationship with a global lead firm.
Knowledge transfer is critical. Soon after Linfeng secured crucial investment from a
Yunnan-based SOE in 2017, it recruited a long-time former senior Nestle employee to
source coffee in Yunnan. A similar strategy was adopted by COFCO, who had earlier
recruited a chief procurement officer from global beverage and confectionary giant
Mars Inc, to head up their coffee division in 2017 (Reuters, 2018a).
Hogood’s production now covers an area of 18000 ha and involves approximately
60 000 households (Hogood Coffee, 2016a). Unlike international companies who
mostly purchase green beans, Hogood generally buys cherries directly from households.
While much of its production is currently for export as green beans, Hogood has ambi-
tions to become not only China’s largest but also the ‘world’s largest soluble coffee
enterprise’ (Hogood Coffee, 2016a). Currently, Hogood is one of the three largest solu-
ble coffee manufacturers in China, alongside two foreign-owned firms: Nestle and
Jiangsu Acesfoods (which belongs to Universal Robina Corporation, a Philippine com-
pany (COFCO Coffee Weibo, 2018)). The current processing capacity of Hogood’s fac-
tory is 13 000 tonnes/year, with an additional 20 000 tonnes to come online in the
next few years (Hogood Coffee, 2016b).
Hogood’s arrangement of capital, land and labour is complex. Eighty per cent of
their production area is a ‘self-owned base’, corresponding to Types C and D, and land
transfer is encouraged by the Yunnan government, with specific reference to coffee
production (DRCYP/DAY, 2010). Land is usually transferred collectively from village
groups, although the land transfer contracts are diverse, with periods ranging from
30 to 70 years. In some instances, we were told of one-off payments for the entire
lease, while elsewhere an initial payment was made for the first 10 years, with a prom-
ise of a second payment after that. The size of contracted area from Hogood to cheng-
baohu (Type C contracting household) varies, with a typical household without hired
labour managing an area of 1 to 2 hectares. Hogood would provide inputs (seedlings
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and fertilizers) and monthly management fees in the form of a loan, while the house-
holds are responsible for their own labour and receive income from cherry sales.
Hogood is able to discipline households with a minimum production of 800 kg/mu
required to maintain contracted status. The protected price offered by Hogood is
adjusted according to market signals: in 2016/2017, the price was 2.5 RMB/kg which
was slightly lower than the market average. Labourers are hired either by chengbaohu
(for Type C operation), or directly by Hogood (for Type D), and were being paid at a
rate of 60−70 RMB per day in 2017, with board provided. The other 20 per cent pro-
duction base is a ‘symbolized’ base, where Type A farmers cooperate with Hogood in a
loose relationship, tending towards a Type B contract. This occurs when land is limited
or too highly fragmented to transfer. Since Hogood is the monopoly buyer in Dehong,
the majority of such coffee farmers in the prefecture tend to sell their product to the
firm. In reality, the state (often local governments) gives DHEs much more than what
is stipulated in formal regulations. They provide permits for opening village-owned for-
est, mobilize farmers into contracting relationships, and facilitate land transfers
(in some cases using coercive measures, see Luo et al., 2017; Gong & Zhang, 2017). In
the cases of Hogood and Linfeng, it seems likely that both prefectural governments
have been actively mobilizing land transfers from farmers, considering the unusually
large areas of land transferred, whilst transfer rates in Yunnan are reportedly much
lower (18.8 per cent) than the national average of (35 per cent) (Yunnan Agriculture
Department, 2017). Indeed, land transfer targets are set by the central government to
encourage cooperation between local governments and agribusiness to establish pro-
duction bases, while the ability to have extensive areas of land transferred has become
a criterion for a company to be granted DHE status.
DHEs attract funding from State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as a form of indirect
‘assistance’ from the state, and both Hogood and Linfeng have had significant invest-
ment from SOEs. For example, Chongqing Energy Investment Consortium, with 10 bil-
lion RMB of registered capital, became a major investor in Hogood in 2016, and
Yunnan State-Owned Capital Operation is slated to be the largest shareholder of Lin-
feng, when we conducted interviews in 2017. In 2012, Hogood announced that
COFCO would become a major investor and, although the deal does not seem to have
since come into effect, it nevertheless signalled the opportunities for Chinese DHEs to
develop value chain opportunities through lead firms like COFCO.
High levels of state support for DHEs was exemplified by an event held subsequent
to the 2016 Association of Science and Information on Coffee (ASIC) Conference in
Kunming, which itself was strongly supported by the government. After the confer-
ence, hundreds of international participants were transported by complimentary flights
to Hogood’s base in Mangshi city for a 2-day Asia Coffee Annual Conference (ACAC),
an event hosted by Hogood. The meeting was held in the ‘Hogood Conference Centre’,
purpose-built for the occasion, and well attended by prefecture government officials,
including party leaders and more than 200 officials from various departments, extolling
the need for China to lead the global coffee industry. The event promoted the idea that
Hogood would be ‘the glory of China’ by becoming the world’s largest coffee company.
The ‘glory of China’ narrative ensures that it is discursively imperative for the govern-
ment and the public to support the company in order to glorify the country. A second
ACAC was subsequently held in 2017, during which an ‘Asia Coffee Association’ was
formed, with Hogood’s owner elected chairman, and a new Certificate for Asian high-
altitude coffee bean, ‘Abody’, was announced. Regardless of the minimal impacts of
these initiatives to date, they demonstrate the ambitions of Chinese firms and
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governments to lead regional coffee supply chains. While the DHE policy is formulated
by the central government, local governments are instrumental in making necessary
conditions for Chinese lead coffee firms like Hogood to integrate vertically and to
develop as a ‘national brand’ (minzu pingpai). Policy supporting agricultural moderniza-
tion is providing Chinese DHEs, like Hogood and Linfeng, with access to essential assets
like capital, land and labour. In addition, the policies are also helping the DHEs to com-
pete with global lead firms such as Nestle and Starbucks.
Internationalization through cross-border trade
State support for Chinese agribusiness is also helping to expand China’s influence on
the coffee value chain into neighbouring countries through cross-border trade and
investment into Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. This is occurring at a time when China
has been actively enrolling these countries through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
a geopolitical agenda pursued primarily through economic partnerships. Cai (2017: 5),
however, explains how the BRI should also be understood as an attempt to ‘create a
regional production chain, within which China would be a centre of advanced
manufacturing and innovation, and the standard setter’. Enterprises like Hogood,
which displays a BRI map at the entrance of its factory, tend to connect with this
agenda explicitly in order to benefit from government support.
The extension of coffee supply chains through Chinese capital into Southeast Asia
(particularly Vietnam and Indonesia) is already well established with COFCO’s recent
acquisitions, and cross-border trade in and out of Yunnan appears to be gaining pace.
Although these operations remain relatively small-scale at present, they are supported
by host governments who grant land concessions. Laos is a key target for coffee invest-
ment and, according to data presented by the Food and Agricultural Organization in
Table 1, coffee production in Laos has actually increased at a rate similar to that in
Yunnan over the last decade, apparently stimulated by Chinese interests. One Yunnan-
based company has been investing in coffee production in northern Laos since 2011,
ostensibly to eliminate opium production (Zhao, 2017), with plans to establish a total
of 12 000 hectares of coffee plantation in Phongsali Province (CSD Coffee, 2018). The
company claims that if the entire proposed area is in production, the total output from
the company could reach to 160 per cent of the entire country’s current coffee produc-
tion (ibid). While this scale of production has yet to be reached (less than 25 per cent
of the proposed area had been developed by 2017), the ambitious plan and its political
agenda has put the company in the spotlight. In 2017, the company not only won rec-
ognition from the central government as one of ‘China’s top 100 agriculture enterprises
for international collaboration’, but China’s national TV station also features the com-
pany’s project as the story exemplifies China’s BRI success (CNTV, 2017).
The expansion of coffee into the neighbouring region appears to be following a sim-
ilar pattern to earlier waves of commodity expansion across these same borders. The
development of the rubber industry in recent decades, for example, provides a tem-
plate for such expansion, and one that has had significant impacts on regional econo-
mies, local livelihoods and ecosystems (Ahrends et al., 2015). During the 1980s, rubber
plantations in Yunnan were initiated and heavily supported by the state in the form of
state farms, and were subsequently adopted by Yunnanese farmers. This rubber boom
then cascaded across national borders into areas such as northern Laos and Kachin
state of Myanmar under the influence of Chinese capital and knowledge (Fox & Cas-
tella, 2013). In these areas, Chinese rubber enterprises often established contract
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farming or gained state concessions, and both practices are currently being pioneered
by Chinese actors in the coffee industry. While the expansion of rubber from Yunnan
occurred more or less autonomously, the current expansion of the Chinese coffee
industry is taking place in an environment of much stronger state support for nascent
lead firms. The platform of an earlier coffee production base in Yunnan appears to have
provided an important arena for skill and knowledge development amongst Chinese
entrepreneurs that we expect will result in further enrolment of these neighbouring
countries into a Chinese-oriented set of coffee value chains. It seems likely that this
mode of cross-border internationalization will ensure a pivotal role for Chinese firms in
regional coffee chains irrespective of the extent of continued agricultural production
within China’s borders.
Conclusion: The rise of Chinese lead firms and implications for regional
development
Our study of recent developments in the Chinese coffee sector has generated insights
into processes reshaping the governance of contemporary GVCs. Chinese firms are
emerging to perform a number of functions in the contemporary GVC for coffee. We
have examined the rise of Chinese lead firms in GVC contexts where their presence
was previously muted, and identified processes through which the Chinese state has
facilitated the emergence of these firms, where the state has attempted to reorient
value chain governance structures by reshaping the institutional environment both
within China and abroad. Shifting end markets towards China are clearly an important
factor facilitating the rise of Chinese lead firms. However, in the case of coffee, this pro-
cess has been further assisted by the concurrent emergence of a substantial agricultural
production base within Yunnan, where the state is able to intervene to support the rise
of lead firms, especially in the form of Dragon Head Enterprises (DHEs). This suggests a
more complicated set of upgrading pathways than is usually considered in the
literature.
The early entry of foreign lead firms (particularly Nestle) in both manufacturing
and supply chain development in China was instrumental in establishing the industry,
and facilitated later firm upgrading, but it may eventually be eclipsed by the prominent
role being played by the DHEs (at least in terms of influence on agricultural production
in Yunnan if not in terms of consumer market share) and abroad by COFCO. Chinese
lead firms are provided with preferential access to agricultural production bases within
Yunnan, providing an important platform for the reliable supply of raw materials from
which they are then able to upgrade to more profitable chain nodes. The active support
of the state has encouraged the expansion of Chinese capital into supply chains and
production systems by further favouring large agribusinesses over smallholders, or
more commonly through the ‘contracting household’ model. This is having significant
implications for the way land is being assembled as a resource in rural Yunnan,
although the environmental and social consequences of this process remain unclear.
Similar models of land assemblage are now being pursued through cross-border invest-
ments, particularly in Laos.
The dominant role played by the state in the coffee sector is a departure from post-
1989 global trends, whereby the GVC for coffee has been deregulated and then effec-
tively re-regulated through private sector governance, including the introduction of
sustainability standards. The commitment of Chinese coffee firms to these same sus-
tainability standards is unclear at this stage, although it seems likely (drawing from Cai,
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2017) that the state is likely to use standards, including new Chinese-authored stan-
dards, as a key vehicle to establish chain governance. A recent sustainability report
published by COFCO (2018b), for example, indicates a broad commitment to sustain-
ability, but favours in-house verification codes over existing third party schemes.
The varied supply chain relationships between agribusiness and coffee farmers in
Yunnan indicate some of the diverse pathways through which land and labour is
being mobilized for accumulation within modern China. The discursive power of state
narratives, with respect to agricultural modernization, which effectively limit the pos-
sibility of alternative modes of living in rural spaces, has ensured that large areas of
land have been assembled for commodity production. Although the specific land ten-
ure and state support structures are peculiar to China, the very forthright involve-
ment in agricultural production by downstream capital appears to reflect a process of
rural development that may have implications elsewhere as Chinese agri-capital
becomes more influential abroad, as discursively supported by the BRI. Further
research, however, is required to examine the specific modes of value chain gover-
nance enacted by rising global lead firms such as COFCO, as well as smaller firms
active in the cross-border trade, to determine the likely effects on processes of rural
development in the region.
China’s increased coffee consumption and subsequent import demand has already
provided upgrading opportunities not only for firms within China, but also for other
regional actors. Roasted and soluble coffee imports have rapidly increased, both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of total import volume. To date, Malaysia and Viet-
nam have been key beneficiaries, where the former relies itself on imports of green
beans from Vietnam and Indonesia, while Vietnam is a major producer itself. As a
result, the concern that Chinese demand would result in increased competition for
manufacturers across the region, and even deindustrialization, has not yet played out
in the coffee sector. Indeed, Cai (2017) emphasized how the Chinese states seeks to
address the country’s excess manufacturing capacity by migrating surplus factories
abroad. This may then create further industrial upgrading opportunities in the region.
Since soluble coffee products for the Chinese market tend to rely on Robusta beans,
which are not currently grown in China at any meaningful scale, these opportunities
are expected to persist for some time, or at least until China’s ambitions to become the
largest instant coffee manufacturer in the world are realized.
The increasing volume of green bean imports into China is also changing the struc-
ture of value chains extending back into key regional producers, such as Indonesia and
Vietnam. The emergence of lead coffee firms from China (including both roasters and
trading companies such as COFCO) is likely to drive new modes of value chain gover-
nance back to sites of production, perhaps favouring models similar to those described
in Yunnan rather than the certified supply chain model currently preferred by estab-
lished lead firms from the West. The regionalization of value chains, led by Chinese
firms, is likely to offer new opportunities for both regional processors and green bean
suppliers across Southeast Asia in particular, although the implications for both liveli-
hoods and natural landscapes of emergent Chinese sourcing practices require further
research.
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Endnote
1 China’s Arabica coffee production is not officially categorized as ‘Other Milds’, but this category
of Arabica is the most comparable (where categorization is essentially based on processing
method).
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